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THE CAMPAIGN 



OF 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 

[APRIL 27— MAY 5. 1863] 
By MAJOR JOHN BIGELOW, Jr., U. S. A. 



A CRITICAL REVIEW 



Reprinted by permission from 
THE SUN of November 6th, 13th and 20th, 1910 

BY 

JAMES HARRISON WILSON 

LATE MAJOR CEN'L U. S. V. 



THE CAMPAIGN 



OF 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 

[APRIL 27— MAY 5. 1863] 
By MAJOR JOHN BIGELOW, Jr., U. S. A. 



A CRITICAL REVIEW 

Reprinted by permission from 
THE SUN of November 6th, 13th and 20th, 1910 

BY 

JAMES HARRISON WILSON 

LATE MAJOR GENL U. S. V. 



Chas. ly. Story, Printer 

WnMiNGTON, Del. 

1911 



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AFR 4 nil 



The entire Truth at Last about the 
Campaign of Chancellorsville. 



Nearly half a century having elapsed since the 
close of the War of Secession, it may well be claimed 
that the time has come for the critical study of the 
strategy and tactics, of the character and qualifi- 
cations of the principal generals and of the plans and 
policies of the opposing sides in that titanic struggle. 
Many histories and biographies have been written and 
published and much technical criticism has been given 
to the world, but The Campaign of Chancellorsville* 
by John Bigelow, Jr., a retired major and graduate 
of West Point who served a term as professor of 
military science and tactics at the Massachusetts In- 
stitute of Technology, is by far the most minute and 
careful military work which has yet been given to the 
country. It contains maps and plans which are nu- 
merous and fairly accurate, but owing to their number 
and to the varying scale are not always as easy to 
follow as they should be. 

While this ponderous volume requires most care- 
ful reading and is primarily intended for the army 
officer and the historical student, it will well repay 

•The Campaign of Chancellorsville, a strategic and tactical study by John Bigelow Jr. 
Maj. U. S. Array, retired, (author of Mars la Tour and Gravelotte, the Principles 
of Strategy, and Reminescences of the Santiago Campaign,) with Maps and Plans. 
New Haven Yale University Press, 1910 



the general reader for all the time and trouble he ex- 
pends upon it. It is divided into "The Period of 
Preparation" and "The Period of Operation." It de- 
scribes the point of view and throws much light on 
the conduct and character of the opposing com- 
manders. It gives the organization and number of 
the opposing forces in great detail from the most 
trustworthy sources and makes it plain that Hooker's 
army at all the stages of the campaign outnumbered 
Lee's about two to one. It clearly describes Hooker's 
turning movement by the right flank behind the 
Rappahannock, the passage of that river and of 
the Rapidan, the marching and fighting through the 
Wilderness to Chancellorsville, Jackson's turning 
movement against Hooker's right flank and rear, the 
gross negligence of Hooker and Howard, Sedgwick's 
passage of the Rappahannock to the left, his tardy 
capture of Fredericksburg, his successful assault of 
Marye's Heights and his delayed advance along the 
highway from Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville 
against Lee's right, his abortive attack and repulse at 
Salem Church, and finally his hasty and unnecessary 
retreat to the north side of the Rappahannock by 
Scott's Ford. 

The author makes it clear that in all the fighting 
from Wilderness Tavern to Fredericksburg, fifteen 
miles apart, Lee from his central position was every- 
where and at all times victorious, and that with the 
single exception of Marye's Heights and here and 
there a gallant charge by a brigade or regimental 



commander, Hooker and his generals were everywhere 
defeated. It is a dismal and humiliating chapter in 
which vanity, boasting and incompetency led our 
armies through the violation of all true military 
principles to disgrace and defeat. 

The author correctly points out that the four 
months which followed Hooker's disgraceful and 
overwhelming disaster at Chancellorsville and ended 
with Meade's partial victory over Lee at Gettysburg 
were the darkest in our military history. For had 
Lee's victory south of the Rapidan been followed by 
one north of the Potomac, as he had every reason to 
hope, it is now certain that England and most of the 
Continental countries would at once have recognized 
the independence of the Southern Confederacy. While 
it does not necessarily follow that this would have 
compelled Lincoln's Administration to do likewise, it 
would have greatly discouraged the National Govern- 
ment and compelled it to put forth greater efforts than 
ever to fill the ranks of the army and to make a still 
closer blockade of the entire southern coast. 

In order to understand the general features of the 
campaign and the gravity of the situation which fol- 
lowed we must briefly analyze the author's work. 



I. 

The theatre of operations lay south and west of 
the Rappahannock River, from 150 to 300 feet wide, 
between fifty and sixty miles from Washington, 



Hooker's headquarters were at Falmouth, opposite 
the old town of Fredericksburg, while his immediate 
base was twelve miles northeast, near the junction of 
the Aquia Creek with the Potomac, where it was 
amply protected by a naval flotilla. Of course most 
of his supplies were brought to that place by water 
and forwarded by rail and wagon to the army in the 
field. 

The entire region north of Rapidan Station on 
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and the Rapidan 
River to its junction with the Rappahannock near 
Hartwood Church was under the effective occupation 
or control of the national forces. The distance from 
Falmouth to Rapidan Station by the country roads 
is about forty-five miles, or two forced marches for 
fresh troops. 

Hooker's army was massed about Falmouth, with 
pickets and detachments keeping close watch on the 
line of the river from Rappahannock Station to the 
mouth of the Massaponax, about five miles below 
Fredericksburg. The entire distance thus covered, 
cutting off the bends of the river, was about thirty-six 
miles. Hooker's force consisted of seven army corps 
of infantry, one of cavalry and seventy-one batteries, 
containing in all 413 guns, with a total officers and 
men present for duty on March 31, 1863, of 136,724, 
or not far from the strength of Napoleon's army in the 
Waterloo campaign. Every army corps commander 
except Sickles was a trained soldier and graduate of 
West Point, and the same would have been true of the 



entire staff except aides-de-camp had Hooker not been 
compelled to substitute Butterfield for Stone, who was 
his first and far better choice for chief. 

Hooker himself was a graduate of West Point 
who had left the army after a few years of inconspicu- 
ous service and in civil life had tasted the sweet oil 
of experience and the vinegar of a checkered career. 
He was an exceedingly handsome man in the prime 
of life who had had the vanity and effrontry after the 
battle of Bull Run to say to the President: "I am a 
damned sight better general than any you had on that 
field!" While in some way which history fails to 
account for satisfactorily, he had gained the sobriquet 
of Fighting Joe Hooker, this was commonly regarded 
by those who knew him best as but poorly deserved. 
While the author evidently had not heard, it is person- 
ally known to the writer that after Hooker was slightly 
wounded in the sole of his foot at Antietam and his 
corps had practically disappeared from the hne of bat- 
tle he was advised and besought to return in an ambu- 
lance, or better still, on a stretcher with his battle flag 
to the fighting line and thus rally his corps and not only 
save the day but perhaps the country as well. He posi- 
tively refused to do so on the ground that he was too 
badly hurt, and yet he retired to Washington, where 
he walked on the wounded foot within ten days. When 
this conduct is compared with that of General Thomas 
J. Wood, who received in one of the Western battles 
a much more serious wound in the heel and continued 
on duty throughout the campaign, or with that of 



8 

General Emory Upton, who was badly wounded by a 
fragment of a shell in the thigh at the battle of Win- 
chester and although positively ordered by Sheridan 
to the rear not only refused to go but after his surgeon 
had stanched his wound with a tourniquet actually 
had himself carried about the field on a stretcher till 
the victory was won, it will be seen that Hooker had 
but comparatively little of that fortitude and still less 
of that aggressive temper which should have gone 
with his sobriquet. 

The simple fact is that he showed himself on 
many occasions to be a swashbuckler and a braggart; 
and while that class frequently contains men of 
courage and daring they generally have but little of 
the talents and less of the character which should be 
found in a general commanding a great army. The 
curious reader will find ample evidence in the volume 
under consideration not only to justify this conclusion 
but to show that both Hooker's strategy and tactics 
were bad, that his plans were crudely conceived and 
poorly executed at every stage of the campaign, that 
his orders were fragmentary, verbose and difficult to 
understand, that his army was divided and scattered 
at the outstart in violation of the fundamental 
principles of strategy and that Hooker himself at the 
crucial hour lost his head, not because he was drunk 
or disabled, as has been commonly supposed for many 
years, but because of personal demoralization and 
lack of effective leadership in the presence of the 
enemy, which his army outnumbered two to one. It 



is said that he afterwards declared he was not afraid 
of Lee or his army, but "had lost faith in Hooker." 



II. 

Lee's Army of Northern Virginia consisted of 
two corps or eight divisions of infantry, one corps or 
two divisions of cavalry and fifty-five batteries, 
generally of four guns each, or 220 pieces in all. His 
total strength present for duty on March 31 was 
returned at 64,799 men, or less than half the force 
by which he was confronted. 

This army, with its centre and the greater part 
of its strength at or near Fredericksburg, held the 
line of the Rappahannock from Rappahannock Station 
by the way of Fredericksburg southeastward to Port 
Tobacco, with a front of about forty-five miles. But 
it should be noted that the region between the Rapidan, 
the Rappahannock and the Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad, from ten to fifteen miles wide, was a sort of 
neutral zone separating the two armies and was weakly 
held by Lee's cavalry. Lee's headquarters were 
between a mile and a half and two miles southwest 
of Fredericksburg. His only line of supplies was by 
the railroad from Fredericksburg to Richmond, about 
fifty miles away, while his principal depot and 
artillery park were at Guiney Station, between twelve 
and thirteen miles from Fredericksburg, or about the 
same distance that Hooker's depots at Aquia Creek 
were from him. In other words, the two armies were 



10 

equally distant from their principal depots and respec- 
tive capitals, occupied about the same front, were 
separated by a considerable river, with wide bottoms 
and commanding bluffs. The only difference was that 
Hooker's line of supplies to his base, was by a broad 
river which could not be cut or obstructed, while 
Lee's was entirely by a poorly constructed railroad, 
with many wooden bridges that could be easily de- 
stroyed. In this important respect the advantage was 
greatly in favor of Hooker. 

But Lee had a countervailing advantage of which 
Hooker had no conception, or at least took no account. 
It lay in the fact that Fredericksburg, covered to the 
front by the deep valley of the Rappahannock and to 
the rear by Marye's Heights, had been the scene of 
earlier operations disastrous to the Federal arms and 
was susceptible of effective defence at all important 
points. This strongly fortified camp was destined so 
to separate and delay that part of Hooker's army 
under Sedgwick, amounting to three army corps at first 
and to one army corps and one division later, as to 
give Lee ample time to throw Jackson against the 
right flank and rear of Hooker's overconfident but 
headless army and after driving it back in confusion 
on Chancellorsville, to turn his victorious divisions 
upon Sedgwick at Salem Church, about midway be- 
tween Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, and not 
only to defeat and cut him off from the latter place 
but to drive him from the turnpike two miles north- 
ward to the Rappahannock at Scott's Ford. 



11 

While the author dwells but little on this im- 
portant episode and Sedgwick has been overpraised for 
the capture of Marye's Heights, there can be but little 
doubt that Sedgwick's failure to reach Chancellorsville 
and his delay in reaching even Salem Church were 
due mainly to the insufficiency of his force after the 
departure of the First Corps and to the natural diffi- 
culties, the river, the heights and the broken country, 
as well as to the fortifications which lay across his 
route. 

Hooker, after the campaign, censured Sedgwick 
severely for his caution and slowness, and there can 
be little doubt that Sedgwick, although brave and loyal, 
was both cautious and slow. While Hooker should 
have anticipated this, there can be but little doubt 
that the obstacles Sedgwick encountered in crossing 
the river, capturing Marye's Heights and advancing 
on Chancellorsville were such as to make it practically 
impossible for him to reach the scene of the greater 
battle in time to attack Lee in the rear while Lee was 
attacking Hooker's main army in front. But for this 
unfortunate state of affairs following the strategic 
blunder which brought it about, it would have been 
possible from the first, notwithstanding the over- 
whelming disaster to his right wing under the weak 
and unfortunate Howard, for Hooker to resume the 
offensive and throw his vastly superior force upon 
Lee's tired divisions and by weight of numbers and 
"mere attrition" if nothing else to gain a substantial 
victory. Even as it was, Sedgwick's retreat from 



12 

Salem Church to Scott's Ford reunited him with 
Hooker and put it in the power of that commander, 
had he been a soldier of unshaken resolution and 
courage, with his superior numbers, many of whom 
had not fired a shot and a majority of whose corps 
commanders voted in favor of holding their ground 
if not of assuming the offensive, to "spring" upon the 
enemy, nearly all of whom had been constantly engaged 
in marching and fighting for six days. According to 
all accounts the result of such a counter stroke as this 
could hardly have been doubtful, but to the disgrace 
of the nation and its army the weak, incompetent and 
demoralized Hooker was not the man to make it. 



HI. 
In order that the conclusion of the foregoing 
section may be more clearly understood certain inter- 
esting facts should be noted in regard to the com- 
position of the two armies. From the official figures 
it appears that while both armies were commanded by 
West Pointers, only 71 per cent, of the Federal as 
against all of the Confederate corps commanders were 
West Pointers. It also appears that 63 per cent, of 
the Federal division commanders and 32 per cent, of 
the brigade commanders were West Pointers, as 
against 83 per cent, and 18 per cent, of the Confederate 
division and brigade commanders. But counting corps, 
division and brigade commanders of both armies the 
percentages of West Pointers were respectively 42 



13 

and 31. Thus it will be seen that so far as trained 
officers in the higher grades were concerned the 
advantage rested decidedly with the Confederates, 
while in the lower it rested quite as decidedly with 
the Federals. 

Another and still more curious fact is that while 
the rank and file of the Army of the Potomac contained 
only 82 per cent, of natives the Army of Northern 
Virginia contained 97 per cent. In other words, the 
former had 18 per cent, of foreigners (largely in the 
Eleventh Corps) , while the latter had only 3 per cent. 

The author gives many other interesting figures 
which cannot be repeated in detail, but they show to the 
surprise of many that although the Army of Northern 
Virginia had all told only 109,859, the ratio of sickness, 
the ratio of absent with and without leave and the ratio 
of those undergoing punishment were smaller in the 
Federal Army than in the Confederate, wh|le the 
number of special extra or daily duty men was greater 
in the former than in the latter. 

The inference to be drawn from all this is that 
notwithstanding Lee's army was better commanded, 
had a simpler and better organization and a larger per- 
centage of native born soldiers. Hooker's army had 
enough West Point officers and native born soldiers 
left to overwhelm Lee, even after the Eleventh Corps 
with its large proportion of foreign born officers and 
men had been imprudently assigned to the right of 
the line and been driven in disgraceful panic from the 
field. 



14 

IV. 

After an inefficacious demonstration by Stone- 
man's cavalry, strongly supported by infantry, against 
the enemy's extreme northeastern outpost at Rappa- 
hannock Station early in February, Hooker's effective 
strength was reduced by orders from Washington 
detaching the Ninth Army Corps of about 15,000 men 
to re-enforce Dix at Fort Monroe. This blunder, 
which is directly traceable to Halleck, was followed 
by a corresponding blunder on the part of Lee detach- 
ing about the same number of men but a much larger 
proportion of his whole strength, to Longstreet at or 
south of Richmond, to confront what he conceived 
might be the forerunner of a great turning movement 
to the James River. Both detachments, it should be ob- 
served, were in violation of the fundamental principles 
of strategy, but while 50,995 Federal soldiers were 
neutralized between Hooker and Dix, who were pow- 
erless to re-enforce each other without permission 
or orders from Washington, 43,239 Confederates in- 
cluded in the single command of the all-powerful Lee, 
were free to move by the shortest possible railway to 
re-enforce any part of the common line from the Rapi- 
dan to Petersburg without let or hindrance of the 
Confederate authorities in Richmond. In short, Lee 
had all the advantages of what strategists call interior 
lines, while Hooker had the disadvantage not only of 
divided command but of exterior lines and of a slower 
transfer by water. 

While the winter of that latitude was compara- 



15 

tively open, the opposing armies and commanders con- 
fined themselves for the month of March and most 
of April to cavalry operations and outpost affairs 
which inflicted no serious injury on either side and 
were principally notable because they called forth in 
an interview between Hooker and his subordinate, 
Averell, the sarcastic question, "Who ever saw a dead 
cavalryman?" While Hooker's cavalry corps con- 
tained between twelve and thirteen thousand men and 
horses present for duty, the proportion of this arm 
to the infantry was far below what experience later 
taught it should have been. Lee's cavalry amounted 
to about 4,138 effectives, but the proportion of mounted 
men of Lee's army was much larger than in the Army 
of the Potomac. 

On March 17 the inconclusive cavalry engagement 
at Kelly's Ford resulted in the defeat of Averell by 
Fitzhugh Lee, but so far as beneficial results to either 
party were concerned the engagement had better have 
been avoided entirely. It led to nothing more serious 
than a chaffing correspondence between Averell and 
Fitzhugh Lee, who had been acquaintances and com- 
rades in the old army. 

The season of idleness which preceded his 
advance was well employed by Hooker at least in per- 
fecting the organization of his forces and in the prep- 
aration to strike an effective blow, the object of which 
should "not be Richmond but the defeat or scattering 
of Lee's army which threatened Washington and the 
line of the upper Potomac." The instructions from 



16 



Washington, made up mostly of hints and suggestions, 
contained but two positive directions : 

That the Army of the Potomac shall assume the 
offensive without any unnecessary delay. 
That it shall not uncover Washington. 
Subject to these reasonable limitations, Hoolcer 
was entirely free to plan and direct the operations of 
his army according to his own ideas. The narrative 
shows that Hooker first thought of turning Lee's right 
flank and forcing his army from the Richmond and 
Fredericksburg Railroad, which if successful, would 
compel him to retreat toward Gordonsville and thus 
uncover Richmond. 

Hooker spent March 11 at Washington in con- 
ference with the President, the Secretary of War, the 
General in Chief, and the Committee on the Conduct of 
War, but just what took place or just what was decided 
upon between him and the Government remains un- 
known to this day. It seems certain, however, that 
Hooker returned to his army confident of hearty co- 
operation on the part of the Washington authorities 
and fixed in the determination that so far as he was 
concerned "there should be no more mistakes or doubt- 
ful results." "If the enemy does not run," said that 
boastful commander, "God help them." Later he 
declared: "I have the finest army the sun ever shone 
on. I can march this army to New Orleans. My plans 
are perfect, and when I start to carry them out may 
God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none." 
But this vainglorious confidence simply confirmed the 



17 

Washington authorities in the desire "that a blow 
should be struck by the Army of the Potomac as early 
as practicable," and this desire, influenced by the fact 
that a number of volunteer regiments would have fiilled 
their term of enlistment and be ready for muster out 
in the course of the spring, caused the authorities to 
urge upon Hooker as early an advance as practicable. 

In forming his general plan of operations Hooker 
wisely concluded that it was impossible to assail the 
enemy in front, where he was strongly fortified along 
the heights overlooking Fredericksburg, and that the 
passage of the river south and east of that place would 
require too many feet of bridging, too many pontoon 
trains and too long a march over bad roads through a 
broken and wooded country, and furthermore that a 
movement in that direction would uncover Washington 
and thus violate one of the fundamental conditions im- 
posed upon him by the Washington authorities. He 
was thus forced to move by his right flank and by a 
passage of both the Rappahannock and the Rapidan to 
place his army in a position south of the latter stream 
from which he could fairly hope to assail the enemy 
on favorable terms, either in the Wilderness or in the 
open country beyond. 

The narrative gives a multitude of quotations and 
extracts which show substantially that Lee had fore- 
seen that Hooker's line of advance would be by a turn- 
ing movement to the right through Hartwood Church 
to the upper fords of the Rappahannock. 

It will be observed that Lee's position was central, 



18 

while Hooker's plan involved a turning march of about 
forty-five miles by his right wing and of about half 
that distance by his centre and left wing. This simple 
fact gave Lee a great advantage. 

Early in April Lincoln visited the army, and 
although his military experience was confined to a 
few weeks' service with the Illinois militia in the Black 
Hawk war he was entertained and instructed by a 
series of stately parades and reviews, which must have 
suggested more of "the circus" and "the grand entry 
of all nations" to his untrained mind than of the cam- 
paign against Lee and his army. It was during this 
visit that Hooker displayed that overconfidence and 
nonchalance in speech and deportment which greatly 
shook the President's confidence in him and his success. 
It might be true that "he had under his command the 
finest army on the planet" and that the defeat of Lee 
and the capture of Richmond were a certainty, but 
there is no doubt that the President's soul was filled 
with apprehension which impelled him in taking his 
leave of Hooker to impress upon him the absolute 
necessity of putting all his men into his next fight. 



V. 

The turning movement began April 27, the 
Eleventh, Twelfth and Fifth corps in the order named 
were to approach and cross the Rappahannock at 
Kelly's Ford, while the Second was to take position 
behind Banks's Ford, about six miles by the dirt road 



19 

west of Fredericksburg, but only four as the crow flies. 
The United States Ford just south of the confluence of 
the Rapidan with the Rappahannock was also to be 
used as a crossing point as soon as the turning move- 
ment from Kelly's Ford by the way of Germanna and 
Ely's Fords should force the enemy to uncover it. In 
carrying out these movements it was evidently 
Hooker's purpose to make Lee believe that his most 
serious advance would be by Banks's and the United 
States Fords. The movements and demonstrations 
were well designed to that end, but the weather was 
gloomy rainy and cold and the roads were in places al- 
most impassable. To make matters worse the Eleventh 
Corps, which had the swinging or marching flank, had 
encumbered itself by an over-supply of wagons and 
rations. At most the turning operation should have 
been completed within two or two and a half days; 
and yet this corps, which was generally regarded as 
the poorest in the army, had burdened itself with sub- 
sistence for ten days. The mistakes were fatal, for 
Howard was not only looked upon as the poorest corps 
commander in the army but his troops contained an 
excess of foreigners, with but a poor reputation for 
celerity and steadiness. The turning movement was 
to be covered by Stoneman with the cavalry, but the 
strength of that arm, which, as has been stated, 
amounted to about 11,000 men, was divided and frit- 
tered away between himself and his subordinates. 

The left wing of the army, consisting of the First, 
Third and Sixth Corps under Sedgwick, was to cross 



20 

the river southeast of Fredericksburg at Fitzhugh's 
and Frankhn's crossings at or before 3 :30 o'clock on 
the morning of the 29th. But as a preliminary to this 
movement the Third Corps was required to waste 
time and strength by passing in review before Sec- 
retary Seward, several foreign ministers and a large 
body of civilians. 

Considering the broad river, its deep valley and 
the fortified heights back of Fredericksburg, it is need- 
less to say that none of the steps in this complicated 
movement was taken in time. Delay and a certain lack 
of confident resolution characterized them all. But by 
noon of the 29th the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, 
covered by the cavalry and closely followed by the 
Fifth Corps, were well strung out on the road from 
Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock to Germanna Ford 
on the Rapidan. They met with no serious resistance. 
Indeed, their march throughout was practically un- 
known to the enemy, and as the distance between the 
two fords was short of ten miles and the distance from 
the last mentioned ford of the Rapidan to Old Wilder- 
ness Tavern was less than five miles more the whole 
march should have been completed before 8 o'clock 
that night. But history records that while the whole 
Eleventh Corps had crossed the Rapidan by 11 o'clock 
P. M., the Twelfth Corps was still crossing at mid- 
night. Both bivouacked south of the river four miles 
short of the first important objective. 

Meade's march from Kelly's Ford to Ely's Ford, 
further east, was a little longer, but was completed 



Ni^ 



21 

by 4:30 P. M. Without waiting to lay a bridge, 
although the weather was rainy and cold, his men 
forded the river, but instead of pushing on to Chancel- 
lorsville, just four miles further, they also went into 
bivouac. Thus three army corps were south of the 
Rapidan, but instead of holding a continuous front 
on the turnpike from Old Wilderness Tavern to 
Chancellorsville, only four miles apart, the Eleventh 
and Twelfth Corps had lost touch with the Fifth, and 
all three with the troops at both United States and 
Banks's fords. 

Hooker now found his army divided and ready 
neither to deliver nor to receive an attack. Had 
Meade continued his movement to Chancellorsville he 
would have forced the enemy to uncover the United 
States Ford and possibly Banks's Ford also. But as 
matters then stood Hooker felt compelled to order 
Couch, with two divisions of the Second Corps from 
the centre, to establish connection by way of United 
States Ford with Meade at Ely's Ford, but this was not 
done till late the next day. The delay was Hooker's 
rather than Couch's. Hooker was late in giving the 
order, and as it does not seem to have reached Couch 
that night, he was necessarily slow in executing it. 



VI. 

But Lee, although he knew that all parts of 
Hooker's army were moving, had not yet fully pene- 
trated his opponent's designs. From Sedgwick's ad- 



22 

vance he was inclined to believe that Hooker's real 
plan was after all to cross the Rappahannock with the 
main part of his army below Fredericksburg, but he 
naturally asked himself what was the probable desti- 
nation of the forces now south of the Rapidan. Ap- 
parently he believed it to be Gordonsville or an 
advance in force upon Richmond, or against his com- 
munications or even against his own army. The whole 
country to his left and rear along the Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad and from Gordonsville to Rich- 
mond was open and practically undefended. So with- 
out wasting time in guessing, like a prudent com- 
mander Lee contracted his own lines by drawing in 
Jackson, who held his extreme right, and not only get- 
ting ready to strike in any direction but to cover his 
depots at Guiney Station. He cautioned his outlying 
detachments and especially his cavalry "to be very 
much on the alert." 

Jackson, who had acquired the habit of taking care 
of himself and of making suggestions, proposed to at- 
tack Sedgwick, who had already crossed the river, and 
while Lee agreed, he thought it might "be hard to get 
at the enemy" and "harder still" to get away from him 
in case of success. In short, he put the responsibility 
upon Jackson, who, after a careful reconnaissance, 
concluded that he could accomplish nothing in that 
direction. 

It was not till between 6:30 and 6:45 P. M., 
April 29, that Lee knew of the Federal advance to the 
Rapidan and not till near noon the next day that he 



23 

knew the Federal cavalry, followed by infantry, was 
advancing on Wilderness Tavern and Chancellorsville. 
Both places were occupied by noon, and Couch was 
ordered to move from United States Ford "to support 
Slocum." A multitude of verbose and confusing orders 
was issued, but instead of giving a well defined 
aggressive plan of action Hooker at 2:15, April 30, 
directed "no advance to be made from Chancellors- 
ville" until the Second, Third, Fifth, Eleventh and 
Twelfth Corps were concentrated at that place. 

While Slocum in the lead established his head- 
quarters that day at Chancellorsville, Howard, moving 
by the Germanna plank road, reached Dowdall's 
Tavern, three and a half miles east of Wilderness 
Tavern, or about half way to Chancellorsville at 4 P. M. 
His day's march was about seven miles. Under 
Hooker's orders to cover the right of the line with his 
own right on Hunting Creek, it was considered by 
Hooker and Slocum as well as by Howard himself, that 
the Eleventh Corps should act as "a flank detachment 
to secure the army against an attack from the west." 
But without reference to orders or understandings all 
competent soldiers will agree that this duty was 
necessarily imposed upon Howard by the position of 
his corps. There can be no difference of opinion as 
to this point, and yet it is in evidence that Howard 
was much more busy in looking toward Todd's Tavern 
and Welford Furnace, to the south, than he was in 
looking toward the west. In view of the fact that it 
is also in evidence that Slocum, with his corps extend- 



24 

ing from the old schoolhouse on the turnpike well to 
the south by the way of Hazel Grove around toward 
Chancellorsville, had told Howard that he would look 
out for everything to his own front, it is clear that 
Howard had but a poor conception of what was re- 
quired of him. 

Hooker and his staff were still twenty miles in 
rear. They started from Falmouth to Chancellorsville 
about 4 P. M. of the second day, April 30, but before 
leaving, Hooker issued a congratulatory order, making 
this announcement to the army : 

"The operations of the last three days have deter- 
mined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly or 
come out from behind his entrenchments and give us 
battle on our own ground, where certain destruction 
awaits him. The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh 
and Twelfth corps have been a succession of splendid 
achievements." 

It will be observed that this "succession of 
splendid achievements" had been gained without fight- 
ing or loss of life. 

At midnight of April 30 Howard was at Dowdall's 
Tavern, Slocum south of the plank road covering 
Chancellorsville, with Meade just west of that place 
and Couch about three-quarters of a mile north of it. 
Lee's nearest forces, under Anderson, Mahone, Posey 
and Wright, were about Zion Church, on the turnpike 
five miles to the east. 

During the whole of that afternoon Hooker was 
busy in ordering bridges taken up and relaid, directing 



25 

Sickles to inarch with his corps to the United States 
Ford, Sedgwick to attack and destroy the enemy in 
his front, and Gibbon to move at daylight the next 
morning and join the corps to which he belonged. In 
all this much stress was laid upon "attacking," "strik- 
ing," "destroying" and "capturing," all of which was 
to be done by Sedgwick, but there was no promise of 
any such action on the part of Hooker himself. The 
right wing was apparently intended to serve as a sort 
of anvil on which Sedgwick was to crush Lee's army. 
Reports from Fredericksburg indicated that Lee was 
receiving reinforcements from Richmond, but this 
apparently gave Hooker no serious concern. 

Lee, it appears, was undecided during most of the 
day as to whether he should abandon his position near 
Fredericksburg or fight to retain it, but the concen- 
tration of troops at Chancellorsville, together with the 
inactivity of those at Franklin's Crossing below Fred- 
ericksburg, satisfied him later in the day th^t Hooker's 
main effort was aimed at his left flank and rear. 
Expecting, therefore, that Hooker would push on from 
Chancellorsville to attack him, he determined, again 
like a self-possessed and competent soldier, to leave 
a part of his force in their lines to delay Sedgwick 
while he moved out with the main body of his army to 
give battle against Hooker's advancing columns. He 
therefore directed McLaws to re-enforce Anderson at 
Tabernacle Church, about four miles east of Chancel- 
lorsville and two miles west of Salem Church. In the 
same order he directed Jackson, after designating a 



26 

division to hold the lines behind him, to march with the 
remainder of his corps at daylight the next morning 
to Tabernacle Church, where he should take charge and 
make arrangements to repulse the enemy. 

The campaign was now on in earnest. Lee's army 
was concentrated with all parts of it in supporting 
distance of each other, but Hooker's was divided, with 
the greater part at or near Chancellorsville, while 
Sedgwick was separated from him by more than ten 
miles as the crow flies and by more than sixteen miles 
by the road on the north and east side of the Rappahan- 
nock. From this it will be seen that Lee from his 
central position was closer to every part of Hooker's 
army than Hooker's extreme army corps were to each 
other. In other words, while Lee could operate from 
his central position on the radii of the circle. Hooker 
was compelled to operate on the circumference. 

While Hooker's passage of the Rappahannock and 
the Rapidan to the rear of Lee's army may well be 
classed among the most brilliant manoeuvres of modern 
military history, the division of his forces and the lack 
of punctuality with which his orders were carried out 
destined them to end in confusion and defeat. 

It appears from the narrative that while the right 
wing was ordered to cross at Kelly's Ford at the earliest 
possible moment on the morning of the 28th, it did not 
commence crossing until six hours after it reached the 
ford. The left wing, which was to have broken camp 
early in the morning, did not start till about the middle 
of the afternoon. The cavalry corps which was to have 



27 

crossed at Kelly's Ford by 8 A. M. did not get over 
until 5 P. M. The bridges which should have been 
laid below Fredericksburg by 3 :30 A. M. of the 29th 
were not all down until noon of that day. The two 
divisions of the Second Corps that should have crossed 
at 7 A. M. did not get over until 5 P. M. 

It should be noted that Hooker's success in reach- 
ing Chancellorsville was not due to concealment, for 
while his general plan had been kept secret, the move- 
ment once started was soon under observation. There 
can be no doubt that had Hooker been inspired by the 
true offensive spirit he would never have allowed his 
whole force to come to a halt at Chancellorsville, but 
would have pushed a portion of it down the Rappahan- 
nock and taken possession of Banks's Ford. Indeed, 
he seems to have made all the necessary arrangements 
which went on with every promise of success until he 
gave up his advance movement and conceived the idea 
of receiving an attack on his "own ground" at Chan- 
cellorsville. 

When it is considered that even with this colossal 
mistake he had ample time to select the best ground 
within reach and to fortify it so completely that it 
would be impregnable, but failed to do so, it will be 
seen that he might have gained a defensive victory at 
least. His indecision and lack of a clear and well de- 
fined plan did not seem in the least to abate his con- 
fidence. Apparently without the slightest conception 
of his real predicament or the slightest premonition of 
his impending fate, he declared in the boastful spirit 



28 

which had characterized him from the first : "The rebel 
army is now the legitimate property of the Army of 
the Potomac. They may as well pack up their haver- 
sacks and make for Richmond." It will be recalled to 
his further discredit that he had been most open and 
uncompromising in the criticism of his predecessors 
without perceiving that this added to the necessity of 
his gaining a substantial victory now that rank and 
command had fallen to him. 



VII. 

It is now certain that, notwithstanding the con- 
centration of 70,000 men and 184 pieces of artillery 
at Chancellorsville and that May 1 was an ideal spring 
morning, the corps and division commanders on the 
ground were filled with apprehension. It had been 
currently reported that Hooker had said the night 
before that "God Almighty could not prevent his de- 
stroying the rebel army," and this, added to the absence 
of adequate plans and preparations for accomplishing 
that great end, doubtless disturbed the minds of even 
the most irreligious. While Warren had gone out 
bright and early to reconnoitre in the direction of 
Fredericksburg and Sickles with the Third Corps was 
coming up from the United States Ford, the other 
corps commanders gathered at army headquarters for 
encouragement. They found Hooker as confident as 
ever that a decisive victory was about to crown the 
brilliant manoeuvres by which he had brought so much 



29 

of his command within striking distance of the enemy. 
As the morning wore away, however, doubt gave way 
to confidence. Orders and aides-de-camp were flying 
in all directions, but withal the formal orders of the 
day were not issued till 11 A. M. Six hours had been 
already lost, and several hours more were added to the 
number while the various corps were taking up their 
new positions. The Fifth Corps was to take position 
on the river road by 2 o'clock ; the Twelfth Corps was 
to mass near Tabernacle Church; the Eleventh Corps 
was to be massed on the plank road a mile in rear (to 
the right) of the Twelfth by 2 o'clock; the Third Corps 
was to take position about a mile north of Chancellors- 
ville near Chandler's, while one division of the Second 
Corps was to be thrown forward from the right 
centre to Todd's Tavern. But it is to be observed that 
these movements were merely a transfer of the army 
from one defensive position to another. While they 
had the effect of taking the army to open ground over 
which its artillery could play and on which the enemy 
could be seen should he assume the direct offensive, 
there was no reference in any of the orders to an 
advance against the enemy's position. 



VIII. 

Notwithstanding the successful movements by 
which Hooker had transferred his army across the 
rivers and through the Wilderness to within striking 
distance of the enemy, the narrative makes it clear 



30 

that its boastful leader had merely taken up a new de- 
fensive position and had no thought of bringing on a 
battle. This is conclusively shown by Hooker's order 
dated May 1, 11:30 A. M., directing Sedgwick "to 
threaten an attack in full force at 1 P. M. and to con- 
tinue in that attitude until further orders. Let the 
demonstration be as severe as can be, but not an at- 
tack." This order shows that Hooker had not at that 
hour the slightest conception of the fact that Lee's 
forces had already been withdrawn from Sedgwick's 
front and were marching toward Zoar or Zion Church. 
While Hooker had outwitted Lee the day before by 
massing his right wing at Chancellorsville, Lee was 
outwitting Hooker to-day by concentrating an equal 
number of men and a larger number of guns on the 
turnpike in his immediate front. 



IX. 

For the actual conflict, the forces arrayed against 
each other were about 40,000 men on a side, instead of 
two of Hooker's to one of Lee's, as they should have 
been. Jackson's forces were marching in two columns 
but were hardly in motion when the Federal pickets 
became aware of the fact. The first gun of the battle of 
Chancellorsville was fired at twenty minutes past 11. 
The Confederate cavalry under Stuart and Fitz Lee 
were well to Lee's left and front, but were still within 
close supporting distance, while the main body of the 
national cavalry had not been heard from but were well 



31 

to the westward, moving southward in a direction 
generally parallel with the Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad. By the Fredericksburg and Orange turn- 
pike, which they crossed at or near Verdiersville, they 
were about fifteen miles west of Chancellorsville, but 
if they took any means whatever to make their position 
or movements known history has failed to record it. 

While nothing decisive occurred that day, the 
advantage was distinctly in favor of Jackson on the 
plank road and of McLaws on the turnpike. From the 
first there was heavy skirmishing but no general 
engagement. 

During the afternoon Lee and Jackson met at 
Decker's on the plank road, and while they were still 
uncertain as to Hooker's intentions they appeared to 
be somewhat surprised at the promptness with which 
he had abandoned his movements toward Fredericks- 
burg as well as at the ease with which his advance had 
been driven back toward Chancellorsville. From the 
weak resistance which Jackson encountered he con- 
ceived the notion that Hooker would retire that night 
to the north side of the river. While Lee hoped that 
this might be realized he did not look for such a result. 
He could not believe that Fighting Joe would abandon 
his attempt so easily, and expressed the very reasonable 
conviction that his real movement would be made from 
Chancellorsville and not from Fredericksburg. 

While a reconnoissance of Hooker's front resulted 
unfavorably to a direct attack on the part of Lee, it 
stimulated his activity and that of his subordinates 



32 

to determine the exact position of the Federal army 
and to penetrate its designs if possible. Just exactly 
what took place between Lee and Jackson or just what 
was said by one to the other can never be certainly 
known, but the general result of the conference between 
the two leaders and of the information obtained in 
reference to Hooker's position was that Jackson 
should conduct a turning movement against Hooker's 
right and rear. Without reference to which of the two 
great Confederates is entitled to the credit of the con- 
ception it is certain that the execution of the movement 
was entrusted to Jackson with the understanding that 
Stuart would cover it with his cavalry. It should be 
remembered that up to that time not an officer or a 
soldier of Lee's had seen the right flank of Hooker's 
army. While the Confederate leaders were not only 
familiar with the country but had the friendly guidance 
of the people living within it, some of whom believed 
that troops could be conducted around Hooker's right 
by the Brock road to the neighborhood of the Old 
Wilderness Tavern, even that was a matter of con- 
jecture. But the movement in the general direction 
indicated by Lee having been finally decided upon at 
about midnight, it was left to Jackson to select the 
exact route upon which he would move. After a con- 
ference with those who knew the country best he 
concluded to march from Decker's by the way of Well- 
ford Furnace around to the Brock road by a circuitous 
route entirely outside and south of the Federal pickets, 
and notified Lee that his troops would be on the march 



33 

by 4 o'clock the next morning. The distance to be 
covered was between nine and ten miles, though that 
might have been shortened somewhat by cutting off the 
angles of the roads. 

During the night of May 1 and the early morning 
of the 2d certain tactical movements were made inside 
Hooker's lines, the main object of which was to form a 
continuous front from the Rappahannock on the left 
to the Rapidan on the right, and while the troops felt 
more or less discouraged in consequence of the day's 
retrograde movements, they were generally buoyed up 
with the belief that they were about to fight a great 
and decisive battle. 



X. 

At 8 o'clock, May 2, the Federal line, much of 
which had been covered by hasty intrenchments, ex- 
tended from Chandler's around Chancellorsville, by 
Hazel Grove to Dowdall's Tavern and beyond, about 
four miles in all. Howard held the extreme right along 
the turnpike, facing directly south for a mile and a 
half with his right refused, and facing west for about 
half a mile at a right angle with his main line, while 
Meade extended Hooker's extreme left from Chandler's 
by the Mineral Spring road to Scott's Ford on the 
Rappahannock, about two miles away. 

Jackson's command for the turning movement 
amounted to 31,700 men, or two-thirds of Lee's entire 
force at hand, with 112 pieces, or four-fifths of his 

3 



34 

artillery, while only 13,000, or a third of his available 
force, with twenty-four pieces, or a fifth of his artillery, 
remained under Lee's personal supervision on the plank 
road and turnpike confronting Hooker's main line 
around Chancellorsville. Certain tactical changes 
were also made within the Confederate lines before 
daylight under the cover of a cannonade which opened 
at 5:16 A. M. for the purpose of obscuring what was 
going on behind. Strong skirmish lines were also 
thrown forward by the Confederates. To these the 
Federal skirmishers promptly responded, which in turn 
convinced Lee that Hooker had not retreated but was 
still at hand ready to defend his chosen position. 

In consequence of all this Jackson's men did not 
get started at 4 A. M., as he had so confidently 
promised, but according to the best authorities it was 
fully two hours after sunrise, or about 7 o'clock, when 
his leading division took the road to the west. Passing 
near Lee, who was standing by the roadside, probably 
at Decker's, Jackson exchanged the last word that ever 
passed between him and his commander. His line of 
march, which was at first parallel with Slocum's front 
and not more than a mile away, soon brought him in 
sight of both the Federal officers and the artillery at 
Hazel Grove. A sharp cannonading opened at once 
on Jackson's column and not only hurried its march 
but apparently caused it to swerve to the southward 
out of sight. 

Meanwhile Hooker, who had been riding his lines, 
returned to headquarters a few minutes after 9 o'clock. 



35 

There he found dispatches from Birney informing him 
that a hostile column with guns, ambulances and trains 
had been marching across his front south of him, 
toward the right since 8 o'clock. Hooker himself from 
his tent in the yard of the Chancellor house now 
caught sight of the same column passing a divide, 
disappearing into the valley of a creek and rising to 
high ground beyond. 

After watching this movement for a while and 
concluding that it was in the direction of Richmond, 
Hooker spread his map on the bed and gave expression 
to his thought somewhat as follows : "It can't be re- 
treat ; retreat without a fight ! That is not Lee. If not 
retreat, what is it? Lee is trying to flank me." 

Now for the first time it seemed to dawn upon 
him that Lee might be intending to attack, choosing 
his own ground for that purpose. Hooker while making 
his personal reconnoissance that morning incidentally 
discovered that Howard's line had been arranged 
apparently for the sole purpose of resisting a front 
attack, and therefore at 9 : 30 he brought this important 
matter to Howard's atention, directing him in writing 
to examine the ground and decide upon the position he 
would assume to meet the enemy, "no matter from 
what quarter he might advance." He added by way 
of postscript: "We have good reason to suppose the 
enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your 
pickets ... as far as may be safe in order to 
obtain timely information of their approach." But it 
will be observed that both the body and postscript of 



36 

this communication were lacking in point and precision. 
Instead of directing Howard positively to throw back 
his right wing, or better, his whole corps, and form a 
strong front to resist an onset from the west, it not only 
contained no such instructions but not a word to him 
or to any one else looking to the arrest of Jackson's 
march or to a counter advance against Lee which would 
make him look to his own security. Instead of going 
in person to Howard, as he might well have done, he 
contented himself with remaining at Chancellorsville 
and sending word to Sedgwick, at least ten miles away, 
"to attack the enemy in his front," if he had a chance, 
but leaving it to "his discretion" whether he should do 
so or not. This makes it clear that Hooker was then 
aware from personal observation "that Sedgwick had 
failed to hold Lee in his position on the Rappahannock," 
and that the point of interest was now moving toward 
the west. 

Meanwhile Lee in person was calmly waiting for 
Jackson's movement to develop, but fully appreciating 
the possibility of failure, he spent a part of his time in 
writing to President Davis. Realizing that the Army 
of the Potomac was in a strong position around 
Chancellorsville, with its communications extending, 
as he thought, to the Rapidan on the right and to 
the Rappahannock on the left, he concluded that Hooker 
was determined to make the fight then and there. 
Like a prudent man, however, he declared to Davis 
that if he found the enemy too strong he would abandon 
Fredericksburg and his advanced position to cover 



87 

Richmond. If successful he would save both and retain 
his communications. He evidently had no expectation 
of reinforcements from Longstreet or from North 
Carolina in time to take part in the contest, but 
thought they might reach him in time for subsequent 
use. While marching by his left to come up in 
Hooker's rear he did not for a minute lose sight of the 
fact that the advantage of numbers and position was 
still greatly in favor of his opponent. 

By 10 :50 that morning Howard himself had seen 
"a column of infantry" moving westward "on a ridge 
about two miles south" of his own position and had 
signified his intention of "taking measures to resist an 
attack from the west." This is apparently the first and 
only conception of that officer as to the real danger 
threatening him. 

At noon Sickles received Hooker's orders to harass 
the enemy in the direction of Wellford Furnace, and 
sent Birney in the same direction to pierc^ the column 
and gain possession of the road over which it was 
marching. Had this movement been pressed with 
vigor and suported by a sufficient number of troops 
from the line in rear it might have arrested the turn- 
ing movement and saved the day, but no such good for^ 
tune was in store for the overconfident Hooker. Jack- 
son's column, although here and there in sight of 
Federal pickets and patrols, continued its leisurely 
march without seeing a hostile soldier till it arrived 
near Burton's farm in the angle between the turnpike 
and the Orange plank road, about half a mile in front 
of Howard's centre. 



88 

From that point Jackson saw a line of intrench- 
ments extending along the turnpike with abatis and 
stacked arms in the rear. Back of these he saw soldiers 
in groups laughing, chatting and smoking, all uncon- 
scious of his proximity. He had expected to find the 
Orange plank road clear and by turning east along 
that road to conduct his columns to Howard's right 
and rear. So far from this being the case, however, 
it became clear that he was not yet in front of Howard's 
right flank. He could plainly see the Federal line 
extending at least half a mile west of the junction of 
the two roads, but how much further in the same 
direction it was impossible to guess. Only one thing 
was certain, namely that he should return to the 
Brock road and continue his march northward along 
it till he reached the east and west turnpike. From 
Fitzhugh Lee he had learned that no part of the 
Federal army rested as far west as Wilderness Tavern. 
The road east of that place toward Chancellorsville was 
clear for an indefinite distance, and the only way in 
which he could satisfy himself how far it was clear was 
to throw himself across that road facing and advanc- 
ing to the eastward along it. It was now 2 o'clock. He 
had covered only eight miles of his march, or about one 
mile an hour, but it was still fully a mile and a half 
to the turnpike by the Brock road, which in that part 
of its course runs nearly due north. If Jackson had 
gathered any correct understanding of his own position 
at this hour, his slowness and deliberation were utterly 
inexcusable. 



89 

At about 4 P. M. Pleasonton's brigade of cavalry, 
all there was with Hooker's army, was sent from 
Chancellorsville to co-operate with Birney and Sickles 
south of Hazel Grove, instead of to Howard's right, to 
keep watch and ward in that quarter. At the same 
hour Hooker ordered Howard to detach a brigade to 
support Sickles, which shows conclusively that although 
the day was three-quarters gone Hooker had as yet no 
conception of the real situation. 

Howard's dispositions at that time were briefly 
as follows . His headquarters were at Dowdall's 
Tavern at the junction of the turnpike and plank 
roads. He had a picket of sharpshooters about 1,000 
yards further west on the Turnpike. East of that 
picket he had five regiments or 2,200 infantry and 
eighteen pieces of artillery, all facing west. Along the 
Turnpike for 2,200 yards or something over a mile he 
had twenty regiments or about 8,600 infantry and 
eighteen guns facing south; or in all about 10,500 in- 
fantry and thirty-four guns, not counting Birney's 
division or Barlow's brigade, which organizations had 
advanced to the south in support of Sickles, thus leav- 
ing a break of about a mile along the Turnpike, between 
the left of the Eleventh and the right of the Twelfth 
corps. Weak intrenchments had been thrown up here 
and there, but the troops facing west, instead of 
being in one well defined and strongly intrenched line, 
were displayed in three distinct but feeble lines, com- 
manded respectively by Von Gilsa, Schurz and Bush- 
beck, all foreigners, and not one of them an experienced 



40 

first class officer. As neither of these lines rested on 
a natural obstacle or had any special feature of 
strength, and as the whole force facing south was 
strung out along the Turnpike, the only line of lateral 
communication, with embankments and rifle pits in 
front and thick woods in rear, the situation for defence 
was about as bad as it could be. 

Both Hooker and Howard should have known by 
this time the danger gathering about their right flank. 
The enemy's columns had been sighted at various points 
from the centre to the extreme right of the army; 
scouting parties from Howard's line had brought in 
word that hostile skirmishers in considerable numbers 
had been encountered from one and a half to two 
miles out; heavy columns had been seen at various 
times during the day, marching steadily to the west, 
but Hooker deluded himself with the thought that 
Sickles was pressing their flank and rear. Heavy 
artillery firing was also heard from that direction, but 
finally died out. Schurz thought that Sickles's opera- 
tion had been suspended, but Howard continued to 
believe that it was progressing successfully. Later an 
officer-of-the-day came in from Deven's picket line with 
the report that a large force of the enemy was passing 
by the right to the rear, but instead of receiving credit 
for what he had seen he was called a coward and 
ordered to his regiment with the remark that the enemy 
was retreating. In spite of all this it is evident that 
the officers of the fighting line were filled with appre- 
hension. 



41 

As late as 3 o'clock a field-ofRcer reported that the 
enemy was massed on the Plank road ready to attack ; 
another that he was actually advancing. Strangely 
enough the first was laughed at and told not to be 
alarmed, while the second was sent back to his own 
corps to "tell his yarn there." At corps headquarters 
they informed him that Lee was in full retreat and that 
the doughty Howard had gone out with Barlow's 
brigade "to fall upon his rear." And yet at that precise 
minute Jackson was writing Lee that the enemy had 
made a stand at Dowdall's Tavern two miles from 
Chancellorsville, that his [Jackson's] leading division 
was up and the next two "well closed," and that he 
intended to attack "as soon as practicable." 

That Hooker in spite of all these facts was still 
laboring under the delusion that Lee was retreating is 
shown by the fact that he had just sent out orders 
directing his corps commanders "to replenish their 
suppHes of forage, provisions and ammunition and be 
ready to start at an early hour tomorrow." An hour 
and forty minutes later, or at 4:10 P. M., he directed 
Sedgwick "to cross the river . . . capture Fred- 
ericksburg with everything in it and vigorously pursue 
the enemy." To clinch the matter he added: "We 
know that the enemy is fleeing, trying to save his trains. 
Two of Sickles's divisions are among them." 

It is probable that Hooker did not believe all he 
said, and it is certain that he did not know that Lee 
was in retreat or in what direction he was going. The 
student who follows this part of the narrative closely 



42 

will be at no loss as to the actual facts, but at a very 
great loss to understand how Hooker could have so 
misconceived their fatal import. 



XL 

While all was uncertain within Hooker's lines, 
Jackson was proceeding slowly but with unerring de- 
termination to form his troops across and perpendicu- 
lar to the Turnpike. His headquarters were at Luckett's 
house near the centre of his line, and his front was 
something over two miles long, with its right wing 
extending south from the Turnpike to the Orange 
plank road. The distance from his headquarters to 
Howard's was about a mile and a half. His troops 
were formed in three lines so that those in the rear 
could fill the gaps which might occur in front. If his 
left did not rest on the Ely's Ford road it was because 
its first advance would certainly place it across that 
road and thus cut off all possible communication be- 
tween Howard and either of the fords behind him on 
the Rapidan. Jackson's entire force in position for the 
attack amounted to about 26,500 men and six guns, as 
against the actual 2,200, and the possible 10,800 which 
Howard could bring into line to resist him. In view of 
the fact, however, that Howard had facing west at that 
time only 2,200 infantry and three batteries of artillery 
his fate was sealed from the first. While many of his 
troops were poor and much looked down upon because 
they were largely emotional and excitable foreigners, no 



43 

effort either they or Howard could have made with all 
his men facing west could have proved efficacious. It 
might have delayed but could not have stopped the 
enemy's onset. 

Jackson's men had gone into position in silence. 
Their bugles were still, and even their orders were 
transmitted in a low voice. All cheering and unneces- 
sary noise were forbiden at first and the troops were 
directed to push ahead at the word without pause, 
using the Turnpike as a directrix. When any portion 
of the first line needed re-enforcement the proper com- 
manding officer was to call for and receive it from the 
next line in rear. Under no circumstance was there 
to be halt or pause, except that if the Federals should 
make a stand to hold Dowdall's Tavern the Confederate 
infantry should halt long enough for the artillery to 
come forward and clear the way. All accounts concur 
in the statement that Jackson was confident of victory 
from the first and that he had arranged after driving 
Howard's forces back to the old school house two miles 
in rear to detach a part of his force to the northeast 
by the Bullock road to move on Chandler's at the junc- 
tion of Ely's and Scott's Ford roads, not only for the 
purpose of breaking Hooker's connections with the 
fords but of driving his routed army into or beyond 
the Rappahannock. 

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon, or ten hours after 
parting with Lee, Jackson began his attack, and 
although some little confusion occurred in getting the 
main line and the skirmishers started at the same time, 



44 

that was soon straightened out, with the result that 
both silently pushed on through the underbrush till 
they came in sight of and rushed upon the Federal 
outpost and picket line. Once engaged the bugles rang 
clear and loud in the evening air and a mighty roar of 
human voices shook the forest to its innermost recesses. 
The firing of the Federal pickets and the rush of "the 
startled game" from its covert gave the alarm to the 
Federal line in the rear, which, be it noted, had already 
stacked arms and was getting supper, preparatory to 
making itself comfortable for the night. The surprise 
was complete. The Federals knew at once that the 
enemy were upon them, but could form no idea of 
their number or the extent of their front. They had 
time, however, to seize their arms and take their 
position in the line of defence. Von Gilsa's two regi- 
ments on the right, exposed both to artillery and in- 
fantry fire, were somewhat under cover and at first 
were a surprise to the enemy, but seeing that they were 
outnumbered and resistance was useless they made 
haste to beat a retreat. This example was followed by 
both Schurz's and Steinwehr's divisions, but no suc- 
cessful stand could be made until the whole force on . 
that flank reached Taylor's house, half a mile to the 
rear. 

A great state of confusion necessarily followed the 
enemy's first onset. As before stated, his strength 
was 26,500 men as against 2,200, or over ten to one, 
and no matter what courage might have been displayed 
or what formations resorted to, the defeat of the 



45 

Federal force was a certainty and their capture highly 
probable. 

Howard, who had been making a reconnoissance, 
got back to his headquarters about this time, and 
although the distance to the fighting was not over a 
mile not a sound or other indication of the conflict had 
yet reached him. He found no news, except that Lee's 
column had been crossing the Plank road obliquely 
about three miles out and apparently headed toward 
Orange court house, or nearly due west. According to 
his own account it was 6 o'clock before he heard the 
sound of the firing at his outposts, but on reaching 
Taylor's Height the awful truth burst upon him. Then 
for the first time he saw his disheartened men on every 
side swarming out of the thickets which he had thougtit 
to be impenetrable. He says in his autobiography 
that "it was a terrible gale. The rush, the rattle, the 
quick lightning from a hundred points at once; the 
roar doubled by echoes through the forest; the panic, 
the dead and dying in sight, and the wounded strag- 
gling along; the frantic efforts of the brave and 
patriotic to stay the angry storm." 

It was a sight well calculated to demoralize a 
stronger man than the hapless Howard, whose neglect 
and disregard of orders, as well as of proper precau- 
tions, were the main cause of the confusion and panic 
which surrounded him. Had he been an alert and 
competent soldier he would have had his whole corps 
facing the enemy as far to the right as Taylor's 
Heights, and although he would still have been outnum- 



46 

bered two and a half to one he could doubtless have 
checked the enemy long enough to allow Hooker to 
come to his assistance, or at least to form his own army, 
two miles in the rear, in such a manner as would en- 
able it to put up a successful resistance. 

All the testimony serves to show that Howard, as 
well as his staff -officers and subordinate commanders, 
exerted themselves bravely and fearlessly to resist the 
enemy's advance. A multitude of details is given. 
Some few organizations, especially those in which the 
majority were foreigners, behaved badly, but the re- 
mainder of the evening and night passed in confusion 
and aimless despair. On the whole there is no chapter 
of recent American history more disgraceful than that 
which describes the disorderly resistance of the Fed- 
eral and unvarying success of the Confederate leader. 
So far as can now be seen this was the inevitable re- 
sult of Jackson's commanding position on the flank, 
his overwhelming superiority of numbers, and of the 
unfaltering onset of his followers, no matter what 
force or obstacles were in their front. In later years, 
Howard declared that he had done his best on that 
occasion, and while he had not been able to stay the 
Confederate onset, he had always felt that "Stonewall 
Jackson was more to blame for the results than he or 
any Federal commander was." He might have added, 
with even more truth, that Hooker was still more to 
blame than either Jackson or himself. This remark 
applies, of course, to the actual fight, where all the 
advantages of numbers and position were in favor of 



47 

the Confederates, but it in no way mitigates or ex- 
cuses the neglect of Howard and Hooker to discover 
Jackson's actual movements and position and to form 
their force in such manner as would best enable them 
to stay his progress. 

Once on the Federal flank, with his force formed 
in three lines perpendicular to Howard's main line, 
with only 2,200 men facing him, Jackson's success, and 
the extent to which it might be carried were simply a 
matter of push and endurance on the part of the Con- 
federates. Had not their much lauded leader lost three 
hours in starting his turning movement and two hours 
more, at least, in completing his final formation and in 
beginning his attack, he would have had fully 
five hours more daylight in which to give his move- 
ments precision and to press his advantages to their 
full fruition. He would neither have fallen a victim 
to his own men in the dark nor failed to see both 
friend and enemy in all their positions and movements 
before the light failed him. What else might have 
resulted is a matter of speculation, but it is safe to 
add, from the incontestable testimony of the records, 
that there was no battle of the civil war in which more 
was lost by deliberation and delay, when the swiftness 
of the tiger was required, than was lost by the Con- 
federates in their torpid march and advance on Chan- 
cellorsville. While they gained a great victory, it 
might have been made still more complete if they had 
recognized that, under just such circumstances, celerity 
was the greatest of military virtues. In this connec- 



48 

tion it will be well to recall that Jackson has been criti- 
cised by Confederate writers for the fatal blunder of 
halting his corps at White Oak Swamp all day instead 
of crossing it and advancing to the attack the Sunday 
before the battle of Malvern Hill. Proper activity 
upon that occasion might have prevented Lee's defeat 
the next day and given him a crushing victory over 
McClellan and his demoralized army. 

With two such charges in the account, the con- 
clusion is inevitable that Jackson, with all his soldierly 
accomplishments, was not a general of the highest class, 
but was occasionally a dreamer and a laggard. 



XII. 

While Jackson was rolling up and driving How- 
ard's badly posted corps back upon Dowdall's Tavern, 
just two miles away, Hooker, with two aides-de-camp, 
was sitting on the porch of the Chancellor House en- 
joying the summer evening. Not a sound had reached 
him from Taylor's farm nor the Wilderness Church. 
Not an officer had come for aid or to warn him of the 
impending danger. It was between 6.15 and 6.30 
when he caught the first sound of distant artillery 
coming from the west, but even then, instead of ascrib- 
ing it to its true cause, he thought it might be from 
Birney or Sickles, who had been sent south to fall upon 
"the retreating enemy." 

Within the vigilant Hancock's lines the suggestion 
was made that the sound of the distant cannonading 



49 

came from Stoneman's cavalry or from some other 
Federal force which had fallen upon the rear of a part 
of the Confederate forces and was driving them east- 
wardly into the Federal lines. Astounding as it may 
seem, the shells from the west, which already had be- 
gun to fall near Chancellorsville, were said to be from 
Federal guns firing at the enemy, as above. It was 
not till Howard's men were met, retreating in confu- 
sion with the trains and ambulances along the Turn- 
pike from the direction of Dowdall's Tavern, that these 
delusions were swept away — not till Hooker and his 
aides-de-camp had ridden up the road and met the 
sickening crowd of fugitives from the west, that either 
Hooker or his staff knew that the Confederates had 
fallen upon his right flank and rear and put his whole 
force in that quarter into full retreat. 

Meanwhile, Schurz, Von Steinwehr and Bushbeck, 
aided by fragments of Devens's division, amounting to 
about four thousand men in all, still with the colors, 
formed across the road a quarter of a mile west of the 
old schoolhouse. They occupied a line of shallow in- 
trenchments previously constructed covering a front 
of a thousand yards, but at 7.10 P. M., Jackson, with 
overwhelming numbers, turned both flanks of this line, 
swept over its intrenchments, and put all there was 
left of the Eleventh Corps in flight. A part of it went 
on to Fairview, a third of a mile west of Chancellors- 
ville, but the main body, under Schurz and Bushbeck, 
took the Bullock road to Chandler's, leaving Chancel- 
lor?ville three-quarters of a mile to the right. This 



50 

was practically the end of the Eleventh Corps in that 
campaign. While it had for two hours, unsupported 
and alone, done such fighting as it could with its faulty 
formation, its disintegration was now complete. 
Henceforth, and for years afterwards, the principal 
aim of Howard and his officers was to vindicate them- 
selves from the results of mistakes which were by no 
means wholly their own. 

But as darkness was now on, the confusion was 
by no means confined to the Eleventh Corps. Jack- 
son's victorious brigades and divisions, weakened by 
stragglers in considerable numbers, in their victorious 
onrush, had also fallen into disorder, and were, there- 
fore, necessarily compelled to reform their own lines 
before they could resume their advance. Both sides 
were, for a while, uncertain as to the next step, but in 
the midst of the confusion stragglers in large numbers 
began to make their appearance in front of the main 
Federal position from the south by the way of Hazel 
Grove. Sickles, who held chief command in that quar- 
ter, although under orders to attack, had evidently 
learned that Howard had been driven back, and be- 
coming doubtful whether he should go forward or with- 
draw also, sent word to Hooker that he would make a 
night attack if supported by Williams's and Berry's 
divisions, but exactly what he hoped to gain thereby is 
by no means apparent. Only one thing seems clear, 
there was as much doubt, darkness and uncertainty 
in his front as elsewhere. The Federal line, so far as 
it could be called a line, had been so contracted that 



51 

from 11 o'clock till midnight it extended from Lewis 
Creek by the way of Hazel Grove, west of Fairview, 
across the Turnpike to the Bullock road and Little 
Hunting Creek. It was about a mile and a quarter 
long. The Confederate line, about a third of a mile 
west, with its right flank refused, conformed in a gen- 
eral way to the Federal line. With daylight the situ- 
ation would have been favorable to the Federals, 
though they were doubtless still more or less shaken by 
Jackson's success. 

Meanwhile Sickles, having received authority for 
his night attack, advanced his line by the light of the 
moon with fixed bayonets and pieces uncapped with 
the antiquated idea of giving the enemy "cold steel," 
apparently northwestwardly toward the Plank road 
and the temporary intrenchments in which Howard's 
men had made their last stand. With neither skir- 
mishers nor scouts in advance, the enemy's exact po- 
sition could not be determined, but it so happened 4;hat 
the centre of the Federal mass penetrated the interval 
between the Federal left and the Confederate right, 
where it received the cross fire of both friend and foe. 
The right of the line actually charged a Federal bat- 
tery before they discovered that they were attacking 
friends. Slocum, who commanded the Twelfth Corps, 
had not been informed that a night attack was con- 
templated, and on hearing the firing supposed that the 
enemy were advancing against the left of his position, 
and at once opened a heavy artillery fire, all of which, 
as a matter of course, was futile. 



62 

It seems to have been a night of pandemonium in 
that quarter as well as in what had been Howard's 
front. Williams, a Federal division commander, in a 
private letter to a friend, said of it : 

"A tremendous roll of infantry fire mingled with 
yellings and shoutings almost diabolical and infernal, 
opened the conflict. ... In the intervals of the 
musketry I could distinctly hear the oaths and im- 
precations of the rebel oflficers, evidently having hard 
work to keep their men from stampeding. 

"In the meantime Sickles's artillery opened fire 
over the heads of the infantry, and the din of arms 
and inhuman yelling and cursing redoubled. . . . 
Shortly, Best began to thunder with his thirty odd 
pieces in front and on the flank; shell, shot and bul- 
lets were poured into the woods, which were evidently 
crowded with rebel masses. . . . Human lan- 
guage can give no idea of the scene. Such an infernal 
and yet subhme combination — sound, flame and smoke 
and dreadful yells of rage, pain and of triumph!" 

It was at the beginning of this period of pande- 
monium that Jackson, whose front had contracted 
from two miles to about half a mile, was on the Plank 
road, encouraging his men to move "right ahead, right 
ahead!" Shortly afterwards Hill joined him, and was 
told to "press them, cut them off from the United 
States Ford, Hill; press them!". Then, directing his 
chief engineer to guide Hill to the front, Jackson halted 
and listened to the sounds from the Federal hnes. 
Hearing the ringing of axes and the officers giving 



63 

commands, he turned about, moving toward his own 
troops, but shortly halted a second time to listen, when 
a volley of musketry from the Federal lines admonished 
him that he was in danger. He and his party, there- 
fore, hurriedly took to the woods north of the Plank 
road and were working their way to the rear, when 
the noise of their horses and their clanking sabres 
coming from the front alarmed the men in line into 
the belief that a charge was about to break upon them. 
It was that incident in the dark which caused an ex- 
cited officer to give the order to fire and to repeat the 
firing. It turned out that the returning general and 
his party were not more than twenty paces in front 
when the regiment holding that part of the Confederate 
line delivered a volley which was fearfully effective. 
Three balls struck Jackson, one penetrating the palm 
of his right hand, the second passing around his left 
wrist, and the third splintering his left arm, severing 
the artery between the shoulder and elbow. 

The same volley killed a staff officer and two or- 
derlies. Jackson's frightened horse, becoming un- 
manageable, dashed through the woods to within a 
hundred yards of the Federal skirmishers before it 
was caught and led to the rear, still carrying its dis- 
abled rider. Great confusion necessarily followed, and 
there was hurrying to and fro among his excited fol- 
lowers. The Federal artillery at Chancellorsville and 
Fairview opened fire, which greatly increased the ex- 
citement. Naturally, it was but a short time till it 
was known throughout the Confederate line's that Jack- 



54 

son had been wounded and sent to the rear; that Hill, 
his successor, had met with a similar misfortune, and 
that in his turn, Stuart, who had been operating 
against Averell at Ely's Ford, four or five miles away, 
was brought to the front, where he found himself at 
midnight in command of Jackson's victorious but dis- 
ordered divisions. His first formal act was, conse- 
quently, to suspend operations till morning. 

It would have been a little less than miraculous, 
under the circumstances, if the Confederate forces, 
although favored by a brilliant moonlight night and 
excited to frenzy by the great success they had gained 
so far, had not lost their way as well as their victorious 
impulse. And thus the battle in the dark came to 
an end. 

During that day Hooker had received reinforce- 
ments amounting to 9,000 men and forty-five pieces of 
artillery. Estimating his losses at 3,000 men and eight 
pieces of artillery, he still had under his immediate 
command at and about Chancellorsville 76,000 men and 
244 pieces of artillery. 

Lee had received no reinforcements, but had de- 
tached one regiment of infantry and one battery of four 
guns. He had lost about 1,250 men killed, wounded 
and missing, which left him and Stuart facing Hooker 
with about 43,000 men and 132 pieces of artillery. 
Early was still watching the lower fords of the Rap- 
pahannock, and covering the depots at Guiney Station. 



XIII. 

At 5 A. M., May 3, the contending forces, as 



65 

above enumerated, confronted each other west of 
Chancellorsville. Stuart, with about 26,500 infantry 
and all the artillery he could use, in three lines, 
1,300 yards from front to rear and a mile and a half 
long, held the Turnpike for a mile east of Wilderness 
Church, facing Sickles, Slocum and Couch about and in 
front of Fairview, and crossing the Turnpike a mile 
west of Chancellorsville. Lee, in person, with the 
rest of his army (except Early) a mile south and south- 
east of Chancellorsville, held a line about two miles 
long with its right on the Turnpike to Fredericksburg, 
its centre on the Plank road and its left somewhat re- 
fused in the direction of Welford Furnace. 

At early dawn Stuart's men were under arms, 
but not yet ready to advance. Rations had to be is- 
sued and lines straightened out, but in spite of all this, 
at 6 o'clock the whole of his skirmishers moved to the 
attack. The battle was joined at once, and after much 
heavy fighting, which was generally favorable to the 
Confederates, the Federal lines were driven back, or 
voluntarily fell back, step by step, till 9.30. Both Hazel 
Grove and Fairview were lost, and the artillery massed 
at the latter place was withdrawn to a new position 
between Fairview and Chancellorsville. 

When the Federal situation, say at or soon after 
9 o'clock, was at its worst, and the whole line in a 
shaky condition, Hooker, while leaning over the bal- 
ustrade of the veranda of the Chancellor House to re- 
ceive an officer from Sickles calling for reinforcements, 
was struck by a fragment of a wooden pillar, near 



56 

which he had been standing. It had been hit by a solid 
shot and split into two pieces, one of which struck both 
his body and his head, knocking him senseless. For a 
few moments he seemed to be dying, but under the care 
of his surgeon he soon revived sufficiently to show him- 
self to the troops. The news of the accident, however, 
soon spread to the army, and Couch, the senior corps 
commander, a stout hearted and courageous officer, pre- 
sented himself at headquarters, as in duty bound, for 
the purpose of relieving the wounded generalissimo. 

Meanwhile, although Hooker's side was not fully 
recovered, he was mounting to ride to Chandler's, in 
the rear, but said nothing about giving up the com- 
mand. At times during the day he suffered paroxysms 
of pain and when not in pain he seemed to be stupid 
or lacking sense to give orders adequate to the occa- 
sion. He had mentally collapsed and it was now cer- 
tain that he had lost confidence in himself. 

For years it was supposed that Hooker, who had 
been generally regarded as a drinking man, was under 
the influence of liquor both at the time of the accident 
and afterward, but the author, who evidently made a 
thorough investigation in all directions, concludes that 
such was not the case, and gives it as his opinion that 
the general had voluntarily denied himself and drank 
nothing from the beginning of the campaign and noth- 
ing after the accident, except a small measure of brandy 
which the surgeon prescribed to revive him, till the 
army was safely on the north side of the Rappahan- 
nock. The author also makes it clear, although Hooker 



57 

suffered "paroxysms of pain" at intervals afterward 
and in later life became partly paralyzed on the injured 
side, that his loss of power to command with his nor- 
mal intelligence was due mostly to constitutional de- 
fects brought out by the overwhelming disaster "the 
best army on the planet" had met with under his over- 
confident leadership from an army "that God Almighty 
couldn't save." 

Early that morning Hooker had ordered Sedgwick 
forward and was, at the time of his accident, expect- 
ing him to advance from Fredericksburg against Lee's 
right and rear, but it is clear that he had not as yet 
thought of attacking Lee in front unless Sedgwick 
should, at the same time, attack him in rear. It also 
appears that he had no thought of reinforcing the 
troops in the fighting line without Sedgwick's approach 
and co-operation. But hearing nothing from Sedgwick 
and being still in doubt as to his movements ten miles 
to the eastward, with Lee's army holding the road be- 
tween them, Hooker decided on his own responsibility 
to abandon the field, and sent for Couch to join him 
at his new camp near Chandler's house. Here Couch 
found him lying in a tent by himself, and as he entered 
Hooker, rising on his elbow, said, "Couch, I turn the 
command of the army over to you. You will withdraw 
it and place it in the position designated on this map." 

It will be observed that the above-mentioned or- 
der, given at or about 9.30 o'clock, was framed in terms 
which left Couch no independent authority, but com- 
pelled him, whether he approved it or not, to withdraw 



58 

the army from its position in front of and around 
Chancellorsville. This was followed at once by another 
order, evidently issued by Hooker in person, directing 
Sickles, who held the extreme southern front, to with- 
draw to a new line, and instructing Hancock and Geary 
to follow him as soon as the road was clear. And this 
was the shameful situation when Lee, with Anderson's 
disjointed line, had made his way by his left to Hazel 
Grove, where he connected with Stuart's right. This 
junction took place at about 10 A. M. 

With such pusillanimous orders, in face of the 
reunited Confederate forces, it was of the greatest 
importance that the Federal army should gain time 
and hold the enemy at bay until the roads leading to 
the rear could be cleared of stragglers and the broken 
and disordered divisions and brigades, which had been 
driven back, could be reformed. While less than half 
its strength had been engaged, the whole army was 
more or less shaken by the untoward events and mis- 
fortunes which, beginning with Howard's defeat the 
day before, had ended with the mental paralysis of the 
chief commander and his determination to retreat 
from the advantageous position which his initial ma- 
noeuvres had given to him and his army. 

The emergency, which he had no part in bringing 
about, weighed heavily upon Couch, but nobly did he 
set about performing the duty which it brought to him. 
"His example was superb. Of slight stature . . . 
and a simple and retiring demeanor, he became sublime 
as the passion of battle and the high mounting sense 



59 

of duty took complete possession of every power and 
faculty, every thought and feeling, every limb and 
nerve. His horse was killed, he was himself twice hit. 
Nobly, too, was he seconded ... by Hancock, 
whose horse was killed" and whose remount was hardly 
large enough "to allow the General's feet to clear the 
ground." 

Meade and Humphreys also, with unshaken cour- 
age, while anxious to remain upon the field and fight 
it out, lent their best eflTorts to withdraw the army and 
maintain order in its retirement to the river. 



XIV. 
By 10 o'clock the withdrawal of the army was fully 
under way, but with such men as the young and heroic 
Kirby to cover the rear with his artillery, and with 
such gallant commanders as Meade, Hancock, Hum- 
phreys and Allabach to direct the infantry, the final 
movements were made with regularity and delibera- 
tion. It was a bright, balmy Sunday morning, in the 
pause of battle, when it was discovered that the dry 
leaves, abatis and dead wood of the surrounding forest 
had caught fire, and many of the wounded, whom it 
was intended to save, had been left to perish miserably 
in the flames. It v/as pitiful to see the charred bodies 
hugging the sheltering trees, the outstretched hands 
of those who had died fighting fire, the gaping wounds 
— ^the torn and mangled limbs, and the dissevered 
heads of those who had fallen and been left to their 



«0 

distressing fate. By noon the withdrawal had been 
completed and the main body of the army had reached 
a place of safety on the south bank of the Rappahan- 
nock. 

The ghastly narrative now turns to Lee and Sedg- 
wick. By the middle of the morning Lee had ridden 
to the front of his advancing line, where he was re- 
ceived with "one of those uncontrollable outbursts of 
enthusiasm" which are inspired by victory alone. 
"The fierce soldiers with their faces blackened by the 
smoke of battle, the wounded, crawling with feeble 
limbs from the devouring flames, all seemed possessed 
of a common impulse. One long unbroken cheer, in 
which the feeble cry of those who lay helpless on the 
earth blended with the strong voices of those who still 
fought, hailed the presence of the victorious chief." 

But in the midst of this splendid ovation a formal 
note of congratulation from Jackson brought official 
confirmation of the fact that he had been disabled by 
wounds, and this in turn called forth the memorable 
reply from Lee: "Could I have directed events, I 
should have chosen for the good of the country to be 
disabled in your stead. I congratulate you upon the 
victory, which is due to your skill and energy." 

While Stuart's management of the attacking force 
at that juncture "made up in spirit what it lacked in 
skill," it was much criticized afterward by the Comte 
de Paris as well as by many Southern writers. But 
the substantial defeat which he inflicted upon his op- 
ponents that morning is his sufficient vindication. The 



61 

valor displayed by the soldiers of his new command 
was of the highest order, but the true time for gaining 
a complete and overwhelming victory was the day be- 
fore during the five hours of daylight which they lost 
in starting and in marching around Hooker's flank, 
and in forming for the attack which they finally de- 
livered with such surprising impetuosity and success. 

The author indulges in much acute criticism, both 
of Hooker and the Confederate leaders on that mem- 
orable day, but the military student will doubtless re- 
gard the defective operations and the tactical mistakes 
of either side as of secondary importance in comparison 
with Jackson's loss of time and the confusion which 
necessarily resulted from his wound and from the night 
fighting which followed, under his successor. 

Lee, at about 12.30 P. M. of the 3rd, was on the 
point of throwing his 34,000 men against Hooker's 
75,000 in a final onset which might have been success- 
ful, but his plan was changed by the ominous tidings 
which reached him at that juncture that the Federal 
forces had carried the heights of Fredericksburg and 
were then advancing against his rear by the Plank 
road. Hastily detaching McLaws's division and Ma- 
hone's brigade of Anderson's, with Alexander's artil- 
lery, to march in the direction of the new danger, with 
the instincts of a fighting general, Lee went in per- 
son in the same direction, leaving Stuart on the de- 
fensive and waiting for developments. Hooker, mean- 
while, had shamefully forgotten the President's part- 
ing injunction: "In your next fight put in all your 



62 

men," 35,000 of whom, be it remembered, had not yet 
fired a shot. Unfortunately the necessary leadership 
was lacking. Couch was not authorized to exercise the 
supreme command because Hooker still retained it. 
The author sensibly suggests, in view of all the facts 
as they were known to the chief surgeon and to the 
leading staff officers, that Hooker should have been re- 
lieved by them as unfit for further service and that the 
second in command should have been notified that it 
was his imperative duty to take charge of the army. 
Such action as this called for the highest qualities, and 
it was an untoward fatality that they were not forth- 
coming. 

According to his orders, Sedgwick should have 
been within striking distance of Chancellorsville by 
daylight of May 3. He started at midnight. The 
distance to be overcome was a scant ten miles, but as 
soon as his head of column left the bridge by which 
it crossed the Rappahannock, it found itself resisted 
by hostile skirmishers which had to be brushed out of 
the way. It was, therefore, 2 o'clock when it reached 
the outskirts, and three before the main column, com- 
posed of the Second and Third divisions, took up the 
march. Sedgwick was a cautious and deliberate man, 
and although Butterfield, the chief of staff, did what he 
could to support and to push him to the front, as well 
as to make him understand that rapidity and prompti- 
tude were expected of him, it must be confessed that 
he at no time displayed the celerity which the circum- 
stances of the case so loudly called for. 



63 

When all his forces were united he had 25,600 men 
and 66 field guns with which to dislodge and drive back 
11,600 men and 48 guns. While the disparity was 
about two to one it was none too great for the assault 
and capture of Marye's Heights, where the Confeder- 
ates were strongly fortified. Seeing with his practised 
eye that the position was a strong one, Sedgwick made 
all his dispositions with deliberation. He had issued 
orders that his men should not fire a shot, but "trust 
to cold steel," and when the charge was sounded the 
veterans of the Sixth Corps in three lines rushed over 
the stone wall and the works beyond without faltering. 
While this successful assault took but a few minutes 
and cost but 1,500 men killed, wounded and missing, 
it was not made till about 10.50 A. M., at about which 
time, it will be remembered, Lee was sweeping Hook- 
er's rear guard out of Chancellorsville. 

The creditable but delayed affair at Marye's 
Heights not only broke the Confederate forces into two 
parts and forced them back in confusion on divergent 
roads, but developed an excellent occasion for the use of 
cavalry against the fleeing infantry, artillery and 
wagon trains. The opportunity for prisoners and spoils 
was a good one, but Sedgwick had no mounted troops 
and, therefore, pushed on from Marye's Heights with 
but a single division of infantry by the Turnpike 
toward Salem Church, five miles out, or about half way 
to Chancellorsville. Till he reached that point he met 
with but Uttle opposition. McLaws, Wilcox, Kershaw, 
Wofford, Semmes and Mahone, with their united force, 



64 

had got there before him. Having occupied a strongly 
intrenched position close to the church, they were ready 
to make savage resistance against any force that might 
assail them. 

With his cautious advance it was about half past 
three when Sedgv/ick's skirmishers came upon the 
enemy's dismounted cavalry covering his line in the 
rear and forced it back upon McLaws at Salem 
Church. This position was well chosen, and as the 
enemy now numbered about 10,000, nearly all of whom 
were covered by intrenchments, it was a difficult and 
doubtful task to dislodge them. Much severe fighting 
was followed by partial success and much loss on either 
side. On the whole the Confederates held their ground, 
and it was half past six when the Federals again rushed 
to the attack and tried in vain to turn the tide of battle. 
Their attack failed, their line was broken and driven 
in confusion to the rear, but fresh troops arriving 
from Fredericksburg were thrown across the road to 
stop stragglers and make good the favorable position 
upon which to reform the broken Federal lines. With 
over 20,000 men at his disposal Sedgwick had assailed 
the intrenched position of the enemy with only 5,000 
men. The odds were two to one against him, but had 
he waited till his whole force had joined him they would 
have been two to one against the enemy. 

The opposing forces slept on their arms that night 
with the dead lying unburied near them. The self- 
poised Sedgwick was greatly disturbed, as well he 
might be. While he knew but little of what had hap- 



65 

pened to Hooker, he was fully aware of the fact that 
his own operations were not only behind time, but that 
his movements had been thwarted by the Confederates, 
whom he had found in such strength, barring his way. 
It is said that he slept scarcely at all that night, but 
rising from his blanket in the damp grass at intervals, 
he would walk a few paces apart and listen, and then 
returning, throw himself upon the ground and try in 
vain to sleep. The Confederates were quiescent also, 
but as Hooker had retired from Chancellorsville, and 
showed no signs of assuming the offensive, Lee decided 
to reinforce that part of his army at Salem Church so 
that it might take the offensive at an early hour the 
next morning. 

Under this arrangement Stuart, with about 25,000 
Confederates, was to confront Hooker and his 75,000 
men, while Anderson, Early and McLaws with about 
23,000 men were to be thrown against Sedgwick, whose 
forces on the field now numbered fully 19,0t)0. It is, 
therefore, clear that the opposing forces at Salem 
Church were more nearly equal that morning than upon 
any other occasion of the campaign, though the advan- 
tage was decidedly with the Confederates, for they were 
on the defensive. But while Lee now thought Sedg- 
wick had two corps instead of one, Sedgwick believed 
that Confederate reinforcements of 15,000 which he 
supposed had come from Richmond had occupied the 
heights of Fredericksburg, cutting him off from the 
town. In other words, each commander at that mo- 
ment estimated the strength of the other at about twice 
as many as it actually was. 



66 

At 7 A. M., May 4, Anderson, with three bri- 
gades, started to join McLaws at Salem Church. By 
eight. Early, with the troops which had been watching 
the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg and cover- 
ing Guiney Station, but which Hooker thought had 
come from Richmond, had retaken the heights of Fred- 
ericksburg, and leaving about 1,600 men and sixteen 
pieces to bar the road to the west against Gibbon 
from the east side of the river, with the remainder of 
his force, amounting to 10,400, marched against Sedg- 
wick's rear, but did not think it prudent to attack till 
Anderson had joined McLaws, which he did at 11 
o'clock. At this juncture, Lee arrived on the ground 
and arranged a general attack front and rear on Sedg- 
wick, to be made at the firing of three signal guns in 
rapid succession. 

Meanwhile Sedgwick had decided to hold his pres- 
ent position till dark and then to withdraw to the 
bridges at Banks's and Scott's fords. It will be seen, 
however, that this was not only an abandonment of the 
road to Fredericksburg, but a retreat northward to 
form a junction with Hooker, whose left now rested at 
Scott's. Sedgwick had no means of knowing the 
enemy's actual strength, but placing it at 40,000 he 
thought himself heavily outnumbered. From the dis- 
patches between him and Hooker it appears that he felt 
at liberty, after withdrawing to the north, to hold his 
new position on the south bank of the Rappahannock 
or to cross over, as he might think best at that time. 
But the situation was further complicated by the fact 



67 

that Hooker, since the blow he received at Chancel- 
lorsville, "had been almost continually alternating be- 
tween sleep and stupor," during which his staff had 
written and sent off the despatches which left Sedg- 
wick in doubt as to what was expected of him and 
what he should do. Fortunately, however, Lee was as 
much in doubt as his opponent, and the afternoon 
"wore away in skirmishing for information and getting 
into position." One writer says that after a personal 
examination of Sedgwick's position, Lee gave orders to 
"break in his centre . . . defeat the two wings 
. . . and scatter the whole force," but the better 
view is that his plan was to crush Sedgwick's left and 
drive him in the general direction of the Plank road, 
and thus prevent him from forming a junction with 
Hooker. 

Be all this as it may, it was not till 5.30 P. M. that 
Lee's three signal guns were fired and his troops 
moved to the attack. Much disjointed fighting oc- 
curred, in which Brooks and Howe on one side, with 
Gordon, Posey and Perry on the other, took part, and 
the Federal line was forced back step by step toward 
Banks's Ford, which it finally covered at night. At 
10 P. M. Lee notified McLaws that he couldn't find 
any of the enemy south of the Plank road, but if left 
alone till morning they would be found again in- 
trenched. He therefore wished to push them over the 
river that night. At 11.50 P. M. Sedgwick reported 
his army as "hemmed in upon the slope covered by 
the guns from the north side of Banks's Ford," adding 



68 

that if he had only his "own army to care for he 
would withdraw it to-night," and then after asking if 
Hooker's operations required that he should jeopard 
everything by holding on where he was, he closed with 
the ominous declaration that "an immediate reply is 
indispensable or I may feel obliged to withdraw." But 
Hooker's mental paralysis continued. All day long, 
still holding command of his 75,000 men, the sound of 
Sedgwick's guns ringing in their ears, he made no 
move, but held in check behind his fortifications brist- 
ling with cannon and swarming with men, he waited 
supinely for Stuart to attack him, or for Sedgwick to 
attack Stuart, 

But that is not the end of the ignoble story. At 
midnight. May 4-5, Hooker had strength and mind 
enough to assemble all his corps commanders except 
Sedgwick, who was too far away, and Slocum, who was 
late in arriving, for a consultation in his tent, and after 
setting forth the condition of affairs and expressing a 
lack of confidence in the steadiness of a part of his 
troops, he gave his generals to understand that he was 
personally in favor of withdrawing to the north bank of 
the Rappahannock. After prejudging the case in this 
manner, he presented to their consideration the ques- 
tion whether the army should advance or withdraw. 
This done, he and Butterfield retired. Meade, Rey- 
nolds and Howard favored an advance. Couch advised 
an attack if he could choose the point of attack, but 
wanted, as a condition precedent, to know if Hooker 
would be in command and how he proposed to operate. 



69 

Sickles, modestly distrusting his lack of experience as 
a soldier, presented reasons for retiring. At that junc- 
ture Hooker returned and gave it as his decided opin- 
ion that he could withdraw the army without loss of 
men or material, and this satisfying Couch that Hooker 
would be in command whichever way the army moved, 
he joined Sickles for withdrawal. The vote, there- 
fore, stood three to two for advance, whereupon Hooker 
announced that he should take upon himself the re- 
sponsibility of Vvithdrawing to the north side of the 
river, and immediately issued the necessary orders to 
that end. Designating the Fifth Corps to act as rear 
guard he at first insisted that the Sixth Corps should 
hold its position on the south bank of the river, but 
vacillating to the end, at 1 A. M., he ordered Sedgwick 
to withdraw; at 1.20 A. M. he countermanded that 
order, but the despatch was delayed en route till 2.30 
A. M., at which hour nearly the whole of Sedgwick's 
force, as well as most of Hooker's artillery, had re- 
crossed the river. The night was dark and rainy, the 
river rose rapidly, the trenches were flooded, and the 
roads became almost impassable for the mud, but 
withal, the entire crossing was finished without acci- 
dent or unusual delay, the last bridge taken up and the 
old camps reoccupied by an early hour next day. 



XV. 

Of course, the facts of this disgraceful campaign 
and the still more disgraceful retreat, in spite of all 



70 

precautions, slowly found their way to Washington and 
to the country at large. A feeling of consternation 
gradually spread abroad, but the depressing force of 
the catastrophe cannot be fully understood even now 
without a few lines explaining the utter mismanage- 
ment of the cavalry. 

It will be remembered that Stoneman, an old reg- 
ular, was in chief command of that arm. Leaving but 
one small brigade under Pleasanton, with Hooker, he 
crossed the Rappahannock with two divisions on April 
29, but bivouacked that night at Madden, less than five 
miles to the front. The next day he marched to Rac- 
coon Ford on the Rapidan, and after crossing to the 
south side he made a fireless bivouac, where he re- 
mained till daylight, and then took up the march to 
Verdiersville, on the Fredericksburg and Orange plank 
road, about fifteen miles west of Chancellorsville. At 
that road-crossing he divided his command, sending 
Gregg ahead some twenty miles to Louisa Court House, 
on the Virginia Central railroad, while he followed 
in the same direction at a more leisurely pace, with 
headquarters, one brigade, the artillery and the 
train. Averell had been left hopelessly in the rear, 
with orders to drive back W. H. F. Lee, to burn bridges 
and to disable the railroad north of Gordonsville, none 
of which he succeeded in doing. 

At 3 A. M., May 3, Gregg reached Louisa Court 
House, and finding no enemy, set about breaking the 
railroad, which he did effectually for a stretch of five 
miles. Stoneman arrived at the same place a few 



71 

hours later, but instead of pushing east to Hanover 
Junction on the railroad to Lee's rear, as his orders 
required, he took post at Thompson's Cross Roads, 
where he divided his force into raiding parties against 
Columbia, the James River Canal, Ashland, Hungary 
Station and Hanover Court House for the purpose of 
burning railroad trestles and bridges and spreading 
alarm throughout the country generally. With his 
4,000 men well in hand he could easily have torn up 
the railroad on which Lee depended, as far north as 
Guiney Station, and after destroying the depot of sup- 
plies, artillery parks and wagon trains, all of which 
he would have found there, he could have swung to 
the northwest and rejoined the right of Hooker's army, 
where he was so badly needed. At Thompson's Cross 
Roads he was within thirty-five miles of Chancellors- 
ville, and distinctly heard the roar of distant artillery 
without ever a thought of riding in the direction from 
which it came. 

It is now certain that Richmond was also at his 
mercy had he marched upon it with his whole force, 
but no militiaman could have been more negligent of 
the true principles of war nor more lost to the oppor- 
tunities before him. His fatuity and incompetence 
were as conspicuous as those of Hooker, and nothing 
worse can be said. His raiding parties, while display- 
ing much gallantry and enterprise, and costing sev- 
eral valuable officers, did the enemy no serious or per- 
manent injury. Several of them became completely 
detached and sought safety from pursuit by riding be- 



72 

tween rivers down to the Chesapeake and seeking the 
cover of the gunboats. It was this which gave color 
to the report from Richmond that "the enemy was 
everywhere." 

But in the midst of the excitement of which he 
was the principal cause, Stoneman himself became 
alarmed, and on the evening of May 5, after a council 
of war, started north by the route he used in coming 
south, leaving his detachments, great and small, to 
find their way to the main body as best they could. 
Rain coming on, the return was slow, but by night 
marching and great precaution he succeeded in uniting 
with Buford at Orange Springs. On May 6, about 
noon, he first heard through the negroes of the country 
that Hooker had been repulsed and had withdrawn to 
the north bank of the Rappahannock. While he did not 
know how much of this to believe, he pushed on, mak- 
ing another all-night march through harder rains, 
greater darkness and muddier roads than the night be- 
fore, but as no one was pursuing or molesting him his 
extreme hurry seems to have been unnecessary. On 
May 7 he recrossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, after 
which he gave his men and horses the first real rest 
they had for a week. The next day he recrossed 
the Rappahannock unfollowed and unmolested and 
marched to Bealton, where he halted for the night. On 
the 11th he returned to his old camp with the army and 
reported in person to Hooker, but that officer, smarting 
under the disgrace of his own defeat and anxious to find 
scapegoats, however small, gave him anything but a 
cordial reception. 



73 

Finally, it must be said, that both Stoneman and 
Averell not only disregarded their instructions, but 
failed to avail themselves of the ample opportunities 
offered them to strike a vital blow at the Confederacy 
either at Guiney Station or at Richmond, or both. Or 
had Stoneman, even without Averell, formed a junction 
with Howard at Wilderness Tavern, he would at least 
have been in position to discover Jackson's turning 
movement in time to prevent or modify the overwhelm- 
ing disaster which followed it. 

It is claimed in Stoneman's behalf that he was suf- 
fering from hemorrhoids during his entire campaign 
and was, therefore, disqualified for such an important 
command, but he had Buford and Gregg, both far abler 
men, with him, and with credit to himself, he might 
have turned the responsibilities over to either with 
great advantage to the service. 

The author, having been a cavalryman himself, 
concludes his account of the cavalry operations with 
many appropriate comments and reflections, but he 
might have added that the most valuable lesson they 
should have taught, especially to the younger men, was 
that the true policy in regard to that arm is to use 
it in masses in close connection and co-operation with 
the main army, and to send it on raids only in over- 
whelming numbers. He might have concluded with 
the reflection that, as cavalry and mounted infantry 
are the only parts of a modern army that can double 
their average marching speed for days at a time, the 
true rule should be not only to keep them at the high- 



74 

est state of efficiency, but to increase their proportion- 
ate strength to the other arms to the greatest number 
that can be kept properly mounted and maintained. 
These are the only means by which an attacking force 
can, with absolute certainty, place itself on the flank, 
rear or communications of the enemy. 



XVI. 

The losses of the Army of the Potomac, out of a 
total strength of 133,868, were 17,278, or thirteen per 
cent., killed, wounded and missing, the heaviest per- 
centage of which fell on the Third, Twelfth and 
Eleventh Corps in the order named. The active part 
of the cavalry lost 389 men, or only four per cent. 
The Federals also lost seventeen colors. 

The victorious Army of Northern Virginia, with 
a total effective strength of 60,892, lost 12,821, or 
twenty-two per cent., killed, wounded and missing. 
Besides, each army lost two generals killed outright or 
mortally wounded. The Confederate army lost fifteen 
colors and four per cent, of its cavalry. 

This admirable work constitutes the most complete 
account ever given of any battle mentioned in American 
history, and this is as it should be, for the ample reason 
that the official records prepared and published by the 
War Department contain every official report that ever 
came into its possession, and these supplemented by 
personal memoirs, narratives and private correspond- 
ence, make Major Bigelow's work one of extraordinary 



75 

interest and completeness. The multitude of circum- 
stances, historical references and personal narratives 
more than anything else, except an occasional failure in 
describing movements to indicate the point from v^^hich 
they started as well as the points at which they ended, 
make it difficult at times to follow the narrative even 
with its excellent maps constantly before the reader. 

But it has been well said that history's proper 
province is to deal with the things which actually hap- 
pened rather than those which did not happen. The 
latter are within the province of speculation, and in 
military matters are left to the Art of War and its 
established maxims. The campaign under considera- 
tion, while it must be admitted that its results were far 
from conclusive, involved the violation of every estab- 
lished strategical principle, whether coming from Alex- 
ander, Hannibal, Csesar or Napoleon. It is well known 
that those great masters agree in defining the essential 
rules of war in all ages substantially, as follows : 

1. To keep the army in the field united. 
Hooker divided his at the start. \ 

2. To assume the initiative and keep it at all 
stages of the campaign. 

Hooker lost his at Chancellorsville at the end of 
the first stage. 

3. To move on the principal objective of the cam- 
paign, by a single fine of operations, or by routes surely 
uniting before the enemy can possibly prevent it. 

Hooker sent the principal part of his army by a 
roundabout route, to his right, leaving the lesser part 



76 

behind to move later to the left, and never succeeded 
in reuniting them till both had been defeated, by a 
force occupying a central position to both. 

4. To cover all approaches to your position so as 
not to be specially vulnerable at any. 

Hooker left his right unguarded and exposed to an 
overwhelming flank attack. 

5. To move rapidly and surely on all important 
points. 

Hooker moved slowly and uncertainly on all. 

6. To concentrate all the forces before the battle, 
for as RawKns, Grant's Chief of Staff, used to say, if 
you can't beat the enemy with all your troops, you 
surely can't do it with a part of them; therefore, 
take all. 

Hooker did not concentrate his, till both wings of 
his army had been driven from the field, and even then 
did not fight, although about a third of his men had 
not fired a shot, and he still had twice as many as 
the enemy. 

Besides, many other principles of organization, 
logistics, administration, strategy and tactics, pointed 
out by Major Bigelow, were flagrantly neglected or 
violated, but to recount them all would require an en- 
tire volume. This is merely a review. 

It may be summed up, in conclusion, that Hooker 
should have marched faster and concentrated his army, 
including his cavalry, south of Banks's Ford, west 
of Fredericksburg, either at Chancellorsville or Salem 
Church. With this done he should have pushed with 



77 

all his might for Guiney Station and Lee's railroad, as 
Grant did for Spottsylvania and Lee's depots a year 
later. If in doing this, Hooker, in the words of Na- 
poleon, had marched ten leagues, fought a great battle, 
and pursued the enemy ten leagues, he would have 
gained a great victory, showed himself to be a great 
commander, and possibly would have ended the war 
at least a year sooner than it was ended. 

The able work concludes with a number of appen- 
dices and as many pages of judicious comments and 
reflections, which cannot be too highly commended to 
military administrators and legislators as well as to 
students of the art of war. 



u 



